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This article attempts to track the various cases in which the public interest behind a provision 
has been identified by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and to demonstrate the 
impact that that public interest has had on how provisions of European trade mark law1 are 
interpreted. It is the author’s contention that, while the public interest plays a central role in European 
trade mark law, its importance is often not acknowledged explicitly by the CJEU. Moreover, there is 
no single public interest in trade mark law. Instead, those interpreting European trade mark law have 
identified competing interests. Where the public interest is raised, it plays a crucial role. This piece 
seeks to demonstrate that where the question is raised in the registrability context, the articulation of 
the public interest leads to the answer favouring a reduction in the scope of trade mark law, whereas 
                                                          
* Reader in Intellectual Property Law; Co-director, Institute of Brand and Innovation Law, Faculty of Laws, 
University College London. The author would like to thank Dev Gangjee, Nicola Countouris, Maria Lee and 
Lynne Chave for their comments and advice during the writing of this article. The author can be contacted by 
email at i.fhima@ucl.ac.uk.  
1 Namely Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to 
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ L 299, 8.11.2008, p. 25. This has now 
been replaced by Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (Recast) (OJ C 327, 12.11.2013, 
p. 42) and Regulation (EU) 2015/2424 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community trade mark and Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 2868/95 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark, and 
repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 2869/95 on the fees payable to the Office for Harmonization in the 
Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OJ L 341, 24.12.2015, p. 21–94).  
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where the context is one of infringement, the different articulation of the public interest means that the 
question is answered in a way that expands the scope of trade mark law.2 Indeed, this is so much the 
case that identical terms can be interpreted in diametrically opposite ways in the two contexts 
It should be noted that ‘public interest’, and the subsidiary term ‘interest’ are terms of art,3 
and it is the thesis of this article that these terms is particular are used in particular by the Court in 
order to mould the shape of trade mark law at critical junctures. While the Court may, of occasion, 
have recourse to broader notions of public policy, it is contended that the term ‘public interest’ is the 
key tool used consistently by the Court, and so it is this in particular that the article tracks. 
Thinking about the public interest 
The one thing scholars agree about the public interest is that it is difficult to define.4 Many see this as 
a sign that, in reality, there is no such thing as the public interest. For example, the political scientist 
Sorauf5 identifies a number of meanings which have been ascribed to the public interest. Of particular 
relevance in relation to the way in which the term has been used in trade mark law are ‘the public 
                                                          
2 For an alternative dichotomous view of the public interest in trade mark law see J. Davis, ‘Promoting the 
public interest and the European Trade Mark Directive: a contradictory approach’ (2013) 14 ERA Forum 117.  
3 Interestingly (and unsurprisingly), the concept of ‘public interest’ plays a role in shaping the rights and 
obligations elsewhere in EU law. See, for example, the labour law cases of  Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet & ors Case C-341/05; International Transport Workers' Federation & anor v 
Viking Line ABP & anor Case C-438/05; AGET Iraklis Case C-201/15. A similar phenomenon is documented in 
the context of environmental law in F. Jacob, ‘The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of the 
Environment’ (2006) 18 JEL 185, 185-200, and in the context of the regulation of genetically modified 
organisms specifically, M. Lee, GMOs in the Internal Market: New Legislation on National Flexibility’ (2016) 
79 MLR 317, 325-333.  
4 For an overview, see the account in R. Giblin & K. Weatherall, ‘If we designed copyright from scratch, what 
might it look like?’, pp. 8-20 in R. Giblin & K.. Weatherall, What If We Could Reimagine Copyright (ANU 
Press, 2016).   
5 F. Sorauf, ‘The Public Interest Reconsidered’19 The Journal of Politics 616 (1957).  
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interest as a superior value’ (which will often be the consumer interest)6 and ‘the public interest as a 
balance of interests’.7 It is argued that the ambiguity surrounding the public interest can actually be an 
advantage, and that in the case of trade mark law, it has different meanings in different contexts, 
allowing it to act as a tool for furthering the objectives of the Court and the trade mark system more 
generally, and also allowing it to take into account the differing interests of the various actors who 
play a role in the market. 
The public interest as a tool for constraining the reach of trade mark law 
In the first group of cases we will examine, the public interest has been used as a way of constraining 
trade mark law in order to protect the interests of third parties. Of particular importance in these cases 
is the need (whether explicit or implicit) to keep certain marks free so that other traders can make use 
of them in order to compete effectively. These cases are primarily in the field of registrability, so 
generally the countervailing trade mark right is yet to crystallise,8 perhaps making it easier for the 
Court to take a more pro-competitor approach.  
Descriptive marks 
Article 3(1)(c) of the Directive9 prohibits the registration of signs which ‘which consist exclusively of 
signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended 
purpose, value, geographical origin, or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the 
service, or other characteristics of the goods or services’. The public interest behind those provisions 
was first identified in Windsurfing Chiemsee as ‘that descriptive signs or indications relating to the 
                                                          
6 P.619.  
7 P.622. The other interests Sorauf identifies are ‘the public interest as a commonly held value’, ‘the public 
interest as moral imperative’ and ‘the public interest undefined’. 
8 Because, except in invalidity cases, the applied for mark is yet to be granted.  
9 Directive 2008/95 (as recently amended as per n.1). The parallel to Art.3(1)(c) is Art.7(1)(c) of the Regulation.  
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categories of goods or services in respect of which registration is applied for may be freely used by 
all, including as collective marks or as part of complex or graphic marks.’10 
Identifying the need to keep certain marks free for others to use as the public interest suggests 
that the provision should be interpreted in a way that favours signs remaining in the public domain 
over propertisation via trade mark registration. This is apparent in Windsurfing Chiemsee itself. 
Chiemsee, as the name of a lake, had a prima facie geographical meaning. However, consumers 
would not believe that goods were manufactured in the middle of lake. Thus, the CJEU had the 
choice: (i) the provision could apply only to marks which were currently being used to describe the 
geographical origin of goods or (ii) the exclusion could include marks which could be used in the 
future in a geographically descriptive way. In the light of the public interest identified, the Court took 
the view that limited the reach of trade mark law and deemed unregistrable marks which were capable 
of designating geographical origin, even if they did not do so at present.11 This opens the way for third 
parties to use these terms in the future, rather than placing them in the hands of one undertaking.  
 The CJEU extended the impact of this ruling from geographical descriptiveness to the 
descriptiveness provision generally in DOUBLEMINT.12 There the question was whether, in order to 
be descriptive, the sign had to currently be in use descriptively. Again, after identifying the 
underlying public interest in keeping marks free, the CJEU answered that, as in Windsurfing, future 
potential use and meanings needed to be taken into account.13 Thus, marks which could be used 
descriptively in the future were left open for third party use. 
                                                          
10 Windsurfing Chiemsee Produktions- und Vertriebs GmbH (WSC) v Boots- und Segelzubehör Walter Huber 
and Franz Attenberger (C-108/97) [1999] E.C.R.I-2779; [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 489, para.25.  
11 Para.37.  
12 Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) v Wm. Wrigley Jr. Company 
(DOUBLEMINT) (C-191/01 P) [2003] E.C.R.I-12447.  
13 Para.32.  
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 Wrapped up in its answer is a further subsidiary question: where a sign has multiple 
meanings, should the sign be barred from registration if any of its meanings are descriptive, or only if 
they all are? In answering that if any of the mark’s meanings are descriptive, this renders the mark 
unregistrable, the Court adopted an approach aligned with the public interest in keeping the maximum 
number of signs possible free for others to use.14 This approach was by no means a foregone 
conclusion. In the US, ambiguity lifts a mark from being descriptive (and thus needing evidence of 
acquired distinctiveness to be registered) to being suggestive (and so being prima facie registrable).15 
We can thus see DOUBLEMINT as a clear example of the public interest driving trade mark law in a 
way that maximises competition in the registrability context where alternative options were available.  
 The descriptiveness cases also highlight an important issue to which we will return,16 of 
whether the fact that there are alternative ways of conveying the information in question should 
prevent the application of the exclusion from registrability. In Postkantoor, after citing the public 
interest in keeping certain marks free, the CJEU answered this question affirmatively. The fact that 
the sign in question was not the only way of describing the goods or services in question, and that 
there were more usual ways of describing the goods or services did not prevent a sign from being 
descriptive. 17 An analogous scenario involving alternatives can be seen in Castel-Freres.18 The 
                                                          
14 Ibid. See similarly Telefon & Buch VerlagsgmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade 
Marks and Designs) (C-326/01 P) [2004] E.C.R. I-1371; [2005] 3 C.M.L.R. 21, para.37.  
15 See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (Thomson Reuters, 4th ed, June 
2017 update), §11:19.  
16 In relation to the availability of the ‘intended purpose’ defence and analogously in considering whether a 
shape is necessary to give a technical result.  
17 Koninklijke KPN Nederland NV v Benelux-Merkenbureau (POSTKANTOOR) (C-363/99) [2004] E.C.R. I-
1619; [2005] 2 C.M.L.R. 10, para.58. Reaffirmed in Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol sp. z o.o. v Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (C-51/10 P) [2011] E.C.R. I-1541, 
para.39.  
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question before the Court was whether one can escape a finding of descriptiveness by misspelling the 
mark. The CJEU answered in the negative. A mark would be descriptive as long as it did not create a 
perception different enough to outweigh the resemblance between the earlier geographical indication 
and the disputed mark.19 Again, there was a choice of adopting a wide or narrow interpretation of the 
scope of the descriptiveness exclusion and, with the public interest in the background, the wide 
approach was adopted, even though there were other means available for conveying the same 
information to consumers.  
 The public interest also played an important role in expanding the scope of Art.3(1)(c) to 
include descriptive shapes. In Linde,20 the CJEU was asked whether shapes could be barred from 
registration for descriptiveness under Art.3(1)(c), bearing in mind that there are already specific 
exclusions regarding shape marks in Art.3(1)(e).21 The Court found that Art.3(1)(c) could apply to 
shape marks, irrespective of the existence of Art.3(1)(e).22 The public interest previously identified in 
Windsurfing Chiemsee of keeping descriptive indicia free for all to use applied just as much in 
relation to three-dimensional shapes as much as any other type of sign, and so descriptive shapes 
could not be registered in the absence of acquired distinctiveness.23 Here the Court could have 
narrowed the reach of the descriptiveness ground in the light of the existence of the specific shape 
exclusions but chose not to in the light of the public interest underlying Art.3(1)(c). In the same vein, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
18 Castel Frères SAS v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (C-622/13 
P) EU:C:2015:297.  
19 Paras 71-80.  
20 Linde AG; Winward Industries Inc.; and Rado Uhren AG (C-53/01 to C-55/01) [2003] E.C.R. I-3161; [2005] 
2 C.M.L.R. 4.   
21 Art.3(1)(e) prevents the registration of shapes which derived from the nature of the goods themselves, are 
dictated by technical function, or add substantial value to the goods. 
22 Para.70 
23 Paras 71-77.  
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in Henkel, the CJEU used the public interest in order to justify the expansion of the descriptive marks 
exclusion to include not just the goods themselves, but also their packaging.24  
 The seeming exception to the rule that the public interest has led to the Court adopting the 
more restrictive route in the area of descriptive signs is in respect of neologisms. In Campina 
Mekunie,25 the Court was asked whether it should be presumed that a mark composed entirely of 
descriptive terms is itself descriptive. It is submitted that answering this question in the affirmative 
would be the option that would be most protective of the public interest in keeping marks free. 
However, the CJEU answered that this cannot be automatically assumed, and allowed for the 
possibility that a mark composed of descriptive terms could create an impression sufficiently far 
removed from the mere combination of its parts in order to allow the mark to be registrable.26 
Nevertheless, the cited27 public interest in keeping marks free is clearly working in the background in 
this case. While the court was prepared to allow for registrability in principle, in practice the Court 
found that a neologism composed of descriptive words will, in the ordinary course of events, be 
assumed to be descriptive without further evidence of consumers seeing it differently.28 As will be 
discussed below, a similar approach can be seen in relation to the distinctiveness of neologisms.  
Functional marks  
Art.3(1)(e) excludes three categories of marks from registration:  
 Shapes which result from the nature of the goods themselves 
 Shapes which are necessary to obtain a technical result 
                                                          
24 Henkel KGaA (C-218/01) [2004] E.C.R. I-1725, para.44. The shape in question was a detergent bottle.  
25 Campina Melkunie BV v Benelux-Merkenbureau (C-265/00) [2004] E.C.R. I-1699; [2005] 2 C.M.L.R. 9.  
26 Para.40. 
27 Paras 35-36.  
28 Para.39. This approach was followed in Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and 
Designs) (OHIM) v Celltech R&D Ltd. (CELLTECH) (C-273/05) [2007] E.C.R. I-2883, paras 77-79. 
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 Shapes which give substantial value to the goods.  
These exclusions share a public interest based on keeping certain marks free for others to use with 
Art.3(1)(c). One of the earliest articulations of this interest (which focuses on the second indent of 
Art.3(1)(e)) was in Philips:  
to prevent trade mark protection from granting its proprietor a monopoly on technical 
solutions or functional characteristics of a product which a user is likely to seek in the 
products of competitors. Article 3(1)(e) is thus intended to prevent the protection conferred by 
the trade mark right from being extended, beyond signs which serve to distinguish a product 
or service from those offered by competitors, so as to form an obstacle preventing competitors 
from freely offering for sale products incorporating such technical solutions or functional 
characteristics in competition with the proprietor of the trade mark.29 
and  
that a shape whose essential characteristics perform a technical function and were chosen to 
fulfil that function may be freely used by all, that provision prevents such signs and 
indications from being reserved to one undertaking alone because they have been registered 
as trade marks.30 
This was expressed more succinctly in Hauck as ‘to prevent trade mark protection from granting its 
proprietor a monopoly on technical solutions or functional characteristics of a product which a user is 
likely to seek in the products of competitors’. 31 
                                                          
29 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd. (C-299/99) [2002] E.C.R. I-5475; 
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 52, para.78.  
30 Para.80.  
31 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v Stokke A/S and Others (C-205/13) EU:C:2014:2233, para.18. The first phrase of 
this definition was originally put forward in Lego Juris A/S v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
(Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (C-48/09 P) [2010] E.C.R. I-8403, para.43.  
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 The public interest in keeping technical solutions free for others to use is particularly visible 
in the way in which the CJEU has adopted the second indent of Art.3(1)(e), which prevents the 
registration of marks which ‘consist exclusively of the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a 
technical result’. The fundamental question has been whether a shape can be considered ‘necessary’ to 
obtain a technical result if there are other shapes which are also capable of achieving the same 
technical outcome. For example, in Philips v Remington,32 the sign in question consisted of three 
shaver heads arranged in an equilateral triangle. It would be perfectly possible (although perhaps not 
quite as efficient) to shave with a shaver consisting of two heads in a row, three heads in an Isosceles 
triangle, or even four heads in a square shape. Thus, it is hard to say that the particular shape for 
which Philips held a trade mark registration was ‘necessary’ to achieve the technical result of shaving 
in the way in which language is conventionally used. However the CJEU found that the provision 
applied where the shape was chosen for its technical result, even if there are other shapes which allow 
the same technical result to be obtained.33 This maximises the scope of the functionality exclusion and 
was justified by reference to the public interest in keeping functional signs free from being 
‘monopolised’ by one undertaking.  This approach was reaffirmed in Lego Juris. 34 There the CJEU 
highlighted  that allowing registration where there were alternatives available would not be effective 
in protecting third party access to a sufficient range of shapes, because trade mark owners can prevent 
the use of similar, and not just identical marks.35 This approach seems analogous to that adopted to 
Art.3(1)(c). As we have seen, there too, the fact that there were alternative ways of achieving the 
result (in that case, communicating the descriptive message to consumers) did not lift the mark in 
question out of the scope of the exclusion.  In both cases, this approach is explicitly identified as 
being justified by the underlying public interest in keeping certain marks free for other undertakings 
to use.  
                                                          
32 Philips, n.29.  
33 Paras 80-83.  
34 Hauck, n.31.  
35 Paras 55-60.  
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 A further (albeit less prominent) example of the public interest being used to widen the 
second indent functionality exclusion can be seen in Pi-Design.36 There the question before the Court 
was whether tribunals should take into account the way in which a sign has actually been used in 
order to judge whether it is functional. Ordinarily, a trade mark representation is expected to be self-
contained. However, in this case, the CJEU found that  
the requirements which must be satisfied by the graphic representation in order to fulfil its 
function, which concern a sign’s general aptness to constitute a trade mark within the 
meaning of Article 4 of Regulation No 40/94, cannot restrict the competent authority’s 
examination under Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of the regulation in such a way as might undermine the 
public interest underlying the latter provision.37 
Consequently, the actual use of the mark could be taken into account in determining whether the 
features of the sign in question had a technical purpose. Thus, in analysing the mark, the tribunal was 
not constrained by the two-dimensional figurative mark consisting of a picture of a blade with black 
dots on. Instead, it could take into account whether actual use suggested that those dots were in fact 
dents in the knife-blade, designed to prevent the knife from slipping.38 Looking at both the mark as 
registered and the mark as used increases the material that can be taken into consideration in assessing 
functionality, and so increases the likelihood of a functionality finding. A similar approach was taken 
in the Rubik’s Cube case.39  There the CJEU used the public interest underlying the second indent to 
justify its finding that the General Court should have considered the internal mechanism of the cube 
                                                          
36 Pi-Design AG and Others v Yoshida Metal Industry Co. Ltd and Office for Harmonisation in the Internal 
Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) and Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks 
and Designs) (OHIM) v Yoshida Metal Industry Co. Ltd (C-337/12 P to C-340/12 P) EU:C:2014:129.  
37 Para.58.  
38 Paras 68-69. The CJEU did not ultimately reach a decision of whether the sign was functional, but referred the 
question back to the General Court.  
39 Simba Toys GmbH & Co KG v EUIPO (C-30/15 P) EU:C:2016:849, paras 38-54.  
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as part of its functionality analysis. This was despite the fact that, being internal, this was not visible 
to those viewing the graphical representation and description of the toy. These decision is particularly 
significant because, from the way the CJEU describes it, it appears that the public interest in the 
functionality ground allows functionality to override the graphic representation requirement. On the 
face of the Directive, these two grounds should be of equal importance.  
 Finally, the interest in keeping marks free for others to use embodied by the second indent has 
been used ambitiously by the Advocates General in order to overcome the fact that, prior to the recast 
Directive, the functionality exclusions were explictly limited to shapes. Thus, in Dyson,40 Advocate 
General Leger opined that the underlying public interest justified viewing shapes as including 
functional features [other than shapes] that affected the appearance of the product. Consequently, the 
transparency of Dyson’s bin was, according to the Advocate General, barred by the second ident. 
Similarly, in Louboutin, Advocate General Szpunar opined that a colour applied to an element of the 
surface of the goods (in this case the red sole of Louboutin shoes) should be considered an element of 
the shape of the goods. If it was not, it would ‘remove the freedom of competitors to offer goods 
incorporating the same functionality’ and so ‘the general interest underpinning Art.3(1)(e)…would 
not be fully served’. 41 In Dyson, the CJEU42 made no mentioned of the Advocate General’s 
reasoning, limiting itself to finding that the mark in question was not a sign. The CJEU’s approach to 
Louboutin remains to be seen.  
 The one example of where the public interest has been used to narrow the second indent 
ground for refusal is in Nestle v Cadbury.43 There the CJEU was asked whether a ban on registered 
shapes which are necessary to obtain a technical result applies only to how the goods themselves 
                                                          
40 Dyson Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (C-321/03) EU:C:2006:558, paras 77-102.  
41 Christian Louboutin, Christian Louboutin SAS v Van Haren Schoenen BV (Case-163/16) EU:C:2017:495, 
paras 51-58.  
42 Dyson Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (C-321/03) EU:C:2007:51. 
43 Société de Produits Nestlé SA v Cadbury UK Ltd (C-215/14) EU:C:2015:604. 
12 
 
function, or whether it also applies to the way in which those goods are manufactured. Arguably, the 
public interest based on allowing competitors to enter the market for functional goods on equal terms 
would suggest that the second indent should apply to the way in which goods are manufactured since 
constraints on methods of manufacture can make a difference to the price of goods or even on the 
competitor’s ability to produce those goods at all. However, the CJEU found that only the way in 
which the goods function need be taken into account, and that their method of manufacture was 
unimportant44. This was explained partially by the fact that there is no reference to the method of 
manufacture in the wording of the provision,45 but also because consumers are interested in how 
goods function, and do not care about how they are manufactured.46 It should be remembered that 
consumer perception plays a deep-seated role in the justification for and operation of trade mark law. 
In this case, consumer perception has overridden the public interest in keeping marks free, causing a 
departure from what it is argued, is the norm, i.e. that in registrability cases, the public interest widens 
the scope of the exclusion.  As discussed above, the same phenomenon is visible in relation to 
descriptive marks, where the fact that consumers view composite word marks as a whole means that 
the descriptiveness of their component parts is not considered per se.  
 In Hauck, the same public interest of keeping certain aspects free for competitors was 
identified as underlying the first indent, which prevents the registration of shapes resulting from the 
nature of the goods themselves. There the CJEU was asked whether the provision only applied where 
the shape was indispensable. This was answered in the negative, as it would mean that the exclusion 
would only apply to natural shapes or regulated products which must be made in that shape for legal 
reasons. This would be incompatible with the public interest of allowing competitors to use shapes 
that they need to compete. Instead the provision was interpreted as applying to shapes where one or 
                                                          
44 Para.57.  
45 Paras 53 to 54.   
46 Para.55.  
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more essential characteristics is inherent to the generic function of the product, and which consumers 
may be looking for in the product.47  
There is a clear link here with the approach taken to the second indent, in that in both 
instances, the public interest is seen as not being sufficiently protected by a rule that allows 
registration where there is an alternative shape available.  
 An expansive approach has also been taken to the third indent of Art.3(1)(e) – a shape which 
gives substantial value to the goods. It was long thought that the purpose of this provision was to 
prevent trade mark law from overlapping with copyright. Consequently that the exclusion applied 
where the value added was attributable to the aesthetic qualities of the shape in question. However, in 
Hauck, after highlighting the purpose of the provision as preventing overlap with ‘other rights’ (i.e., 
not limited to copyright, but also potentially encompassing patents and designs), the CJEU confirmed 
that the provision applies not only to value that stems from artistic or ornamental sources, but also 
from functional aspects.48 Again, in increasing the considerations that can be taken into account when 
assessing functionality, the CJEU has increased the possibilities for marks to be deemed unregistrable, 
and consequently open to use by third parties.  
 An interesting aspect of this decision is that the Court considered whether consumer 
perception of whether the aspect of the shape in question added substantial value to the goods was 
decisive. The Court found that it was not,49 which stands in contrast to the approach taken both in 
relation to Art.3(1)(b) and the method of manufacture in the second indent. Here, the public interest in 
keeping marks free is overriding consumer perception.  
 More generally, the public interest has been used to explain the finding that the various 
grounds under Art.3(1)(e) can be applied concurrently, but cannot be used in combination when they 
                                                          
47 N.31, paras 20-27.  
48 N.31, paras 30-32. 
49 Para.34.  
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are only partially made out. This outcome is perhaps inevitable though as a matter of statutory 
interpretation.50 
 
Marks lacking distinctiveness 
Art.3(1)(b) prevents the registration of marks which are devoid of distinctive character. The public 
interest identified as underlying Art.3(1)(b) is less about keeping signs free for others to use,51 and 
more about ensuring that the subject-matter of the registration is in fact capable of acting as a trade 
mark. Thus, in SAT.1, the CJEU identified the public interest behind this provision as being 
‘manifestly, indissociable from the essential function of a trade mark’.52 The essential function of a 
trade mark was in turn identified as ‘to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product to 
the consumer or end-user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the 
product or service from others which have another origin’.53 On first glance, this approach has led to 
decisions where the public interest expands the reach of trade marks. For example, in SAT.1, the 
CJEU overturned the General Court’s decision on distinctiveness because the GC has considered the 
meaning of the components of the mark (SAT + . + 2) separately, rather than considering the 
impression that the mark as a whole made on consumers. The more expansive view, as was discussed 
in relation to descriptiveness, would be to also consider whether the individual components were 
distinctive.  
                                                          
50 Hauck (n.31), paras 39-43; Nestle (n.43), paras 46-51. Because there is nothing in the wording to the Directive 
to suggest that they can be combined, or that one excludes the other.  
51 Indeed, this is explicitly ruled out SAT.1 SatellitenFernsehen GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property 
Office (C-329/02 P) [2004] E.C.R. I-8317; [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, para.36.  
52 Para.27. 
53 Para.23.  
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 However, when applying Art.7(1)(b) in practice, the CJEU has implicitly adopted an 
approach that narrows the reach of trade mark protection and expands the scope of the exclusion from 
registrability.  This is particularly visible in relation to both shapes and colours. This is unsurprisingly. 
On the one hand, limiting the availability of such signs can have a serious impact on the ability of 
competitors to provide competing products. However, on the other hand, such signs do not fit easily in 
the descriptiveness ground which has keeping certain marks free as its underlying public interest.  
 In relation to shape marks, the CJEU, beginning in Linde, has repeatedly stated that the same 
test for distinctiveness applies for shape marks, as compared to other types of marks.54 However, the 
Court has gone on to say that in practice, it may be more difficult to establish that consumers will 
recognise a shape of a product as indicating origin.55 Indeed, in Henkel,56 the Court went further. 
While purporting to apply the same standard of distinctiveness to shape marks as to other marks, it 
expressed the test as follows 
 a simple departure from the norm or customs of the sector is not sufficient to render 
inapplicable the ground for refusal given in Article 3(1)(b) of the Directive. In contrast, a 
trade mark which significantly departs from the norm or customs of the sector and thereby 
fulfils its essential original function is not devoid of distinctive character.57  
                                                          
54 Linde n.20, para.46.  
55 Linde n.20, paras 46-48, Henkel n.24, para.52.  
56 Henkel n.24. 
57 Para.49. For an example of this approach in operation, see Deutsche SiSi-Werke GmbH & Co. Betriebs KG v 
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (C-173/04 P) [2006] 
E.C.R. I-551, para.63, where the CJEU differentiated between Art.3(1)(c), which the Court said looks at whether 
the shape may be commonly used in the future by competitors and Art.3(1)(b), which considers whether the 
shape is already in general use.   
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Nowhere else is a ‘significant’ departure from existing signs on the market required and generally a 
vaguer (and arguably lower) level of distinctiveness has sufficed.58 It is thus submitted that what the 
Court is doing is limiting the scope of trade mark law through the registrability criteria, while at the 
same time paying lip-service to what it has identified as the public interest behind Art.3(1)(b). In 
practice, this makes it very difficult to register a shape mark, particularly where it consists of the 
shape of the product itself or its packaging.  
 The Court has been explicit about its use of the public interest to limit registration on 
distinctiveness grounds in relation to colour marks. In Libertel, it was put to the Court that there was a 
finite number of colours and that the supply could be exhausted if applicants were permitted to 
register undelimited single colours. The CJEU has explicitly identified descriptiveness and the shape 
mark provisions of Art.3(1)(e) as those which protect the public interest in keeping marks free for 
other competitors to use. However, colours are not shapes59 and descriptiveness did not capture the 
objection to registration here, which was not directly based on the relationship between the 
goods/services and the (colour) mark.  Nevertheless, the CJEU accepted that there was a public 
interest in not unduly restricting the availability of colours for other traders to use, and that this could 
be considered under Art.3(1)(b). Moreover, in line with the approach taken elsewhere in Art.3(1)(b) -
that it is sometimes very difficult as a matter of fact to show that a mark is distinctive - the Court 
found that it was ‘near inconceivable’ that an undelimited colour would be distinctiveness absent use.  
This public interest was reaffirmed in Heidelberger Bauchemie 60 in relation to combinations of 
colours. There the Court allowed the registration of colour combinations but took a restrictive 
                                                          
58 See J. Mellor et al, Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2014), §§ 
8:042 - 8:056.  
59 Although going forward, the Recast Directive, Art.4(1)(e) has amended the functionality ground so that it is 
no longer limited to shapes.  
60 Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH (C-49/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-6129, para.41.  
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approach to when they could be registered, requiring a systematic arrangement of the colours in a 
predetermined and uniform way.61 
 However, even in relation to word marks, when it comes to compound word marks, the way 
in which the CJEU has applied Art.7(1)(b) to actual marks has tended to  militate against registration. 
Thus, when considering the distinctiveness of neologisms composed of descriptive terms, the Court 
found  
‘a mark consisting of a word composed of elements, each of which is descriptive of 
characteristics of the goods or services in respect of which registration is sought, is itself 
descriptive of the characteristics of those goods or services unless there is a perceptible 
difference between the word and the mere sum of its parts’.62  
 
This is consistent with SAT.1, in the sense that it requires tribunals to consider the marks as a whole to 
determine whether the whole is different from the sum of its parts. In practice though, it is near 
impossible to find any examples of neologisms that meet this test.63 Indeed, Eurohypo established a 
(rebuttable) presumption against this.64  
 In fact, the Court has gone further and found that a mark composed of an abbreviation 
followed by a combination of descriptive words will also lack distinctiveness. This is because it too 
                                                          
61 Para.42.  
62 Para.54.  
63 With the notable exception of Procter & Gamble Company v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
(Trade Marks and Designs) (C-383/99 P) [2001] E.C.R. I-6251. Three further examples are given in the 
EUIPO’s Examination Guidelines (n.54) at §2.3.2.2.  
64 Eurohypo AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (C-
304/06 P) [2008] E.C.R. I-3297, para.69.  
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will not be perceived by consumers to have a different overall impression from its descriptive parts.65 
A similar approach can be seen in relation to the mark BioID, which likewise was not distinctive 
because the combination of two descriptive terms and certain minor figurative elements did not create 
an impression that different from the descriptive meaning of the two elements.66 
 
The right to bring opposition proceedings 
Donaldson Filtration v ultra air67 underlines the importance of the public interest underlying the 
exclusions from registrability. The opponent to registration had applied for the mark in question to be 
invalidated in order to be able to use it on its own products. However, the fact that the opponent had a 
personal interest in the mark being invalidated did not mean that its application for invalidity 
amounted to an abuse of process. Regardless of that private interest, the Court stressed that there 
Articles 7(1)(b) and (c) protect the public interest, meaning that any person could rightly mount an 
opposition on those grounds in order to protect the public. Indeed, the whole point of Art.7(1)(c) was 
to keep the sign in question free so that others could use it for their goods.68 
 
The public interest as a tool for expanding the reach of trade mark law 
The various public interests identified above in relation to registrability tend to be rather ‘one sided’ – 
either about leaving certain signs available, or ensuring that the sign truly can function as a trade mark 
                                                          
65 Alfred Strigl — Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt and Securvita Gesellschaft zur Entwicklung alternativer 
Versicherungskonzepte mbH v Öko-Invest Verlagsgesellschaft mbH (C-90/11 and C-91/11) EU:C:2012:147, 
para.35 (the mark in question was ‘NAI — Der Natur-Aktien-Index’). 
66 BioID AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (C-37/03 P) 
[2005] E.C.R. I-7975, paras 69-75.  
67 Donaldson Filtration Deutschland GmbH v ultra air GmbH (C-450/13 P) EU:C:2014:2016, paras 41-49. 
68 Para.43. 
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- without consideration for the interests of the would-be trade mark owner. Thus, public interest in the 
context of registrability emphasises free competition and maximising the availability of marks to third 
parties. There is a further line of cases where the public interest identified has been used to expand the 
reach of trade mark law. These cases tend to cluster round inter partes issues – usually infringement.  
In these cases, as we are about to see, the focus is much more on balance, with interests pertaining to 
both the trade mark owner and its competitors identified.  
 
Double identity 
Art.5(1)(a) of the Directive states that a trade mark owner can prevent third parties from using ‘any 
sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with 
those for which the trade mark is registered’. If read literally this provision appears to provide 
automatic protection where the parties’ marks and goods/services are identical. However, in Arsenal v 
Reed, the CJEU stated that ‘the exclusive right under Article 5(1)(a) of the Directive was conferred in 
order to enable the trade mark proprietor to protect his specific interests as proprietor, that is, to 
ensure that the trade mark can fulfil its functions.’69 This would appear to place the interests protected 
under this article firmly within the ambit of protecting the trade mark owner. However, the Court 
went on to say that ‘The exercise of that right must therefore be reserved to cases in which a third 
party's use of the sign affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark, in particular its 
essential function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods.’70 In other words, only 
genuine interests of the trade mark owner can be protected. This narrows the reach of trade mark law 
by clarifying that what might appear like absolute protection can in fact only be relied on by the trade 
mark owner when the origin function of his trade mark is compromised.  
                                                          
69 Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed (C-206/01) [2002] E.C.R. I-273; [2003] 1 C.M.L.R.12, para.51. 
70 Ibid.  
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 Indeed, in the first tranche of cases following Arsenal v Reed, the CJEU used this formula to 
narrow the seemingly absolute protection of Art.5(1)(a) down to situations where the use of the 
identical mark would be likely to confuse consumers as to the origin of the junior user’s goods. Thus, 
in Anheuser Busch, the CJEU was asked whether a trade name identical to a registered trade mark 
could infringe that registered trade mark. The Court answered in the affirmative, but only where ‘the 
consumers targeted, including those who are confronted with the goods after they have left the third 
party’s point of sale, are likely to interpret the sign, as it is used by the third party, as designating or 
tending to designate the undertaking from which the third party’s goods originate.’71 Similarly, in 
Adam Opel, the senior user owned a device mark (the Opel logo) for toys, although its primary 
business was the manufacture of full-sized cars. The junior user produced scale models of those cars 
which, as faithful reproductions, included the Opel logo at the front of the bonnet. Once again, it 
would seem like identical signs were being used for identical goods (the junior toys versus the senior 
registration for toys). However, after citing the interest identified in Arsenal v Reed, the CJEU ruled 
that  
‘If, by those explanations, the referring court intended to emphasise that the relevant public 
does not perceive the sign identical to the Opel logo appearing on the scale models marketed 
by Autec as an indication that those products come from Adam Opel or an undertaking 
economically linked to it, it would have to conclude that the use at issue in the main 
proceedings does not affect the essential function of the Opel logo as a trade mark registered 
for toys.’72 
However, in more recent cases, the CJEU has used the interests of the trade mark owner that 
Art.5(1)(a) has been identified as protecting in order to broaden the reach of trade mark law. In 
L’Oreal v Bellure, the CJEU repeated its statement in Arsenal that Art.5(1)(a) was intended to protect 
the trade mark owner’s specific interests as a proprietor, and that therefore it had to be limited to 
                                                          
71 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v Budĕjovický Budvar, národní podnik (C-245/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-10989, paras 59-60.  
72 Adam Opel AG v Autec AG (C-48/05) [2007] E.C.R. I-1017, para.24.  
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situations where the exercise of the right was liable to affect one of those functions. However, in 
L’Oreal, the CJEU did not limit those functions to the essential function of indicating origin, which is 
harmed primarily by causing confusion. Instead, the L’Oreal Court recognised that marks have other 
functions which need to be protected, namely, communication, investment and advertising.73 Indeed, 
the Court went on to explicitly state that Art.5(1)(a) was wider than Art.5(1)(b), which is limited to 
situations where there is a likelihood of confusion.74 
 In practice, the Court has not applied the L’Oreal ruling to its full extent, and has failed to 
identify situations in which those other functions are affected,75 save in the context of parallel 
importation (discussed below). It is argued though that once the possibility of those additional 
functions has been admitted, there remains the potential for the Court to use those functions in the 
appropriate case to widen the reach of trade mark law via Art.5(1)(a).  
Confusion-based infringement 
Art.5(1)(b) states that a trade mark owner can prevent third parties from using  
                                                          
73 L'Oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie SNC and Laboratoire Garnier & Cie v Bellure NV, Malaika 
Investments Ltd and Starion International Ltd (C-487/07) [2009] E.C.R. I-5185, para.58.  
74 Para.59.  
75  In Die BergSpechte Outdoor Reisen und Alpinschule Edi Koblmüller GmbH v Günther Guni and trekking.at 
Reisen GmbH (C-278/08) [2010] E.C.R. I-2517, para.36, the CJEU found that in the context of advertising 
keywords, there would only be infringement under Art.5(1)(a) when the advertisement either suggested that 
there was an economic link between the trade mark owner and junior user, or if it was so vague that consumers 
could not tell whether such an economic link was present. In both Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis 
Vuitton Malletier SA, Google France SARL v Viaticum SA and Luteciel SARL and Google France SARL v 
Centre national de recherche en relations humaines (CNRRH) SARL and Others (C-236/08 to C-238/08) [2010] 
E.C.R. I-2417, paras 75-99 and Interflora Inc. and Interflora British Unit v Marks & Spencer plc and Flowers 
Direct Online Ltd (C-323/09) [2011] E.C.R. I-8625, paras 37—66,  the Court explained the nature of the various 
functions in great detail, but failed to state in concrete terms what would compromise those functions. 
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‘any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and the identity 
or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade mark and the sign, there exists a 
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association 
between the sign and the trade mark’.  
The underlying public interest is rarely cited in the jurisprudence on confusion-based infringement. 
This is likely to be because the provisions are taken at face value, and the dual interests of protecting 
consumers and trade mark owners from deception are quite obvious. One notable exception is BGW.76 
There the question was whether there was a likelihood of confusion between the senior word and 
figurative mark containing the letters BGW and the applied-for word mark BGW Bundesverband der 
deutschen Gesundheitswirtschaft (which in English means Federal Association of German 
Healthcare). The case is an interesting one for our purposes because the Court explicitly identifies the 
fundamental difference between the public interest underlying the inter partes provisions, and that 
underlying the absolute grounds for the refusal of registrability. The junior user attempted to rely on 
Strigl (discussed above), where, in respect of Art.3(1)(c), the Court found that a three-letter 
abbreviation tacked on to beginning of a descriptive term could not differentiate it from that 
descriptive term. Thus, the junior user argued that in this confusion case, the three-letter prefix could 
not dominate the junior mark and lead to confusion. However, the CJEU rejected the making of such a 
presumption on the basis of Strigl. The Court observed77 
 
[T]he absolute grounds for refusal of registration set out in Article 3(1)(b) and (c) of Directive 
2008/95 and the relative grounds for refusal of registration set out in Article 4(1)(b) of that 
directive pursue different aims and are intended to protect distinct interests. 
                                                          
76 BGW Beratungs-Gesellschaft Wirtschaft mbH v Bodo Scholz (C-20/14) EU:C:2015:714. 
77 Paras 23-26.  
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The general interest underlying Article 3(1)(c) of Directive 2008/95 is that of ensuring that 
signs which describe one or more characteristics of the goods or services in respect of which 
registration as a mark is sought may be freely used by all traders offering such goods or 
services … 
The notion of general interest underlying Article 3(1)(b) of that directive is indissociable from 
the essential function of a trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the 
product or service covered by the mark to the consumer or end-user by enabling him, without 
any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from others which have 
another origin … 
By contrast, Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2008/95 is intended to protect the individual interests 
of proprietors of earlier marks that come into conflict with the sign applied for and thus 
guarantees the trade mark as an indication of origin if there is a likelihood of confusion … 
[internal citations omitted] 
 
Thus, while consumer perception had a key role to play in relation to all the provisions, the angle 
from which consumers viewed the mark, and the relationships they were likely to make between the 
terms in question and their component parts differed. In this case, that meant that similarity of marks 
leading to confusion could not be ruled out on the basis that all that was shared was a three-letter 
abbreviation. This was despite the fact that the existence of a similar abbreviation might be given less 
weight in a different context.78 Here, given the different public interests involved, the CJEU has 
explicitly used the existence of the abbreviation to widen the scope of trade mark law, by keeping 
open the possibility of confusion, whereas a similar three-letter abbreviation, in the context of 
descriptiveness would not be sufficient to bring the mark in question into the reach of trade mark law.  
( 
                                                          
78 Para.42. 
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The general defences 
Art.6(1) of the Directive provides defences where the junior user is using his own name or address; is 
using the mark descriptively (and under  Art.14(1)(b) of the Recast Directive, non-distinctively) or is 
using the mark to indicate the intended purpose of the goods or services, including to serve as spare 
parts for branded products. Clearly, an important justification for these defences is to enable junior 
users to use signs which are the same as, or similar to senior signs in order to be able compete 
effectively. The public interest behind the descriptiveness ground for refusal to register is articulated 
solely in terms of the interests of the junior user. In relation to the defences though, the interest 
involved is expressed in terms of a balance:  
 By thus limiting the effects of the exclusive rights of a trade mark proprietor, Article 6 of the 
Directive seeks to reconcile the fundamental interests of trade mark protection with those of 
free movement of goods and freedom to provide services in the common market in such a 
way that trade mark rights are able to fulfil their essential role in the system of undistorted 
competition which the EC Treaty seeks to establish and maintain.79 
Indeed, it is telling that in this overall statement, the countervailing interest to the senior trade mark 
rights is expressed in instrument terms, focussing not on the junior user’s interest, but rather on the 
effect that denying the use would have on the establishment and maintenance of the single market.  
 The junior interest in availability does get an airing in Adidas II,80 where the CJEU noted that 
‘Article 6(1)(b) of the Directive seeks to ensure that all economic operators have the opportunity to 
use descriptive indications. As noted by the Advocate General in points 75 and 78 of his Opinion, that 
                                                          
79 This expression originates in Bayerische Motorenwerke AG (BMW) and BMW Nederland BV v Ronald Karel 
Deenik (C-63/97) [1999] E.C.R. I-905; [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 1099, para.62, and has been repeated many times. It 
should be noted that BMW was, in part, an Art.7 case, which may explain the emphasis on free movement.  
80 adidas AG and adidas Benelux BV v Marca Mode CV and Others (C-102/07) [2008] E.C.R. I-2439, paras 44-
49. 
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provision therefore gives expression to the requirement of availability.’ Availability though was 
limited. It could not be interpreted as giving an independent restriction on the effects of the senior 
trade mark than exceeded descriptiveness as defined in Art.6(1)(b). Thus, the general argument that 
the junior user should be able to benefit from the descriptive use defence where it was using simple 
stripes which should be free for all to use was rejected.  Admittedly, a generalised ‘keep free’ 
argument was also rejected in relation to Art.3(1)(c) for registrability. The difference here though is 
that for registrability, any sign that potentially could be used descriptively is barred from registration. 
In contrast, there is an ongoing dispute around the scope of descriptiveness in relation to the defences. 
While in Gerolsteiner it was suggested that if the sign was used descriptively, it did not matter if it 
was also used as a trade mark to indicate the origin of the junior goods,81 the opposite was stated in 
Windsurfing Chiemsee.82 In the arguably equivalent case of a mark which has two meanings under 
Art.3(1)(c), the Court has consistently favoured the position which make the mark available for third 
parties to use.  
 A further example of a restrictive approach being taken to the scope of Art.6(1)(b) is Adam 
Opel. As described above, the junior user had produced scale models of Adam Opel cars, which 
included the registered trade mark-protected Opel logo. Autec argued that this amounted to 
descriptive use as it was describing the junior goods as scale models of Adam Opel’s full-sized cars. 
However, this interpretation was rejected by the CJEU. In a rather Delphic judgment, the Court 
appears to suggest that the difficulty here was that the descriptive use defence covers situations where 
a mark is being used to describe properties of the junior goods, but not, as here, when it was 
describing properties of the senior goods.83 It should be noted that there is no such limitation in the 
Directive, which speaks about the defence applying to ‘goods or services’ without specifying whose. 
Similarly, in Portakabin, the CJEU suggested that, although it cannot be ruled out, in most cases, use 
                                                          
81 Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co. v Putsch GmbH (C-100/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-691, para.15. 
82 Windsurfing Chiemsee, n.10, para.28. 
83 Adam Opel n.72, paras 43-44.  
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of another’s trade mark as an internet keyword will not be descriptive of the junior goods, and 
therefore will generally not fall within Art.6(1)(b).84 Presumably the thinking behind this is that using 
a trade mark as a keyword describes the trade mark owner’s goods, rather than the junior users, unless 
the mark can be used generically.85 
 Art.6(1)(c) provides a defence where the use of the trade mark is ‘necessary to indicate the 
intended purpose of a product or service, in particular as accessories or spare parts’.  In other words, 
there are two components: (i) the use must indicate the purpose of the product or service and (ii) the 
use must be necessary to do so. Given that the rationale behind this rule has been explained in Gillette 
in terms of the balance between trade mark rights and free movement of goods, it is perhaps 
surprising that the Court has taken a relatively liberal approach to what counts as the intended purpose 
of a product. Thus, in BMW, the Court found that indicating that the junior user serviced branded cars 
indicated the purpose of the junior services and so fell within the defence.86 Similarly, in Gillette, the 
Court stressed that the defence was not limited to accessories or spare parts and instead took in any 
use that indicated the intended purpose of the goods, including, as in that case, the provision of 
replacement blades for branded shavers.87  
 On the other hand, the approach to the second element of the defence – that the use must be 
‘necessary’ to indicate the purpose - limits the scope of the defence. As we have already seen in the 
context of functionality, ‘necessity’ is a tricky concept. It will be remembered that in relation to 
functionality, the Court adopted a broad view to the meaning of necessity. There the Court ruled that 
it was sufficient for something to be ‘necessary’ if this was what motivated its choice, rather than it 
being required that it had to be the only way of achieving the desired result. However, when it comes 
                                                          
84 Portakabin Ltd and Portakabin BV v Primakabin BV (C-558/08) [2010] E.C.R. I-6963, paras.60-61.  
85 As per para.61.  
86 BMW, n.79, para.59. 
87 The Gillette Company and Gillette Group Finland Oy v LA-Laboratories Ltd Oy (C-228/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-
2337; [2005] 2 C.M.L.R. 62, para.32.  
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to the intended purpose defence, the Court has taken the opposite position. For intended purpose, it 
has found that the use will only be necessary (and therefore permitted) if it is the only way of 
achieving the result of communicating the information to consumers. Thus, in BMW, the Court noted 
that the use of the BMW mark was ‘necessary’ to inform consumers that the junior user maintained, 
repaired and was a specialist in BMW cars because ‘that fact cannot in practice be communicated to 
his customers without using the BMW mark.’88 This was restated in Gillette, where the Court held   
that such use of a trade mark is necessary in cases where that information cannot in practice 
be communicated to the public by a third party without use being made of the trade mark of 
which the latter is not the owner …As the Advocate General has pointed out in points 64 and 
71 of his Opinion, that use must in practice be the only means of providing such 
information.89 
The Court went on to state that there would not be necessity if there existed technical norms applying 
to this form of goods which the public would understand and which would provide the same 
information.90 This narrow approach to the defence gives third parties very little discretion (or indeed 
margin of error) in determining what would be the best way to communicate their message about their 
competing goods to the public. This could lead to chilling effects amongst litigation-averse junior 
users, who fear that that the relevant tribunal’s view of whether the information could be 
communicated another way is different from their own. It is also clear evidence of the phenomenon 
whereby, on the basis of identical language, the public interest has led to a narrowing of the reach of 
trade mark law in the case of registrability and a widening of its scope in the case of infringement.  
 There is an additional piece in the defences jigsaw, which is that the availability of all the 
defences is subject to the junior use being ‘in accordance with honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters’. The interest identified as being behind this provision - that it is ‘in substance the 
                                                          
88 BMW, n.79, para.60.  
89 Gillette, n.87, para.35.  
90 Para.36.  
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expression of a duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the trade mark owner’91 -  
places it strongly in the camp of protecting the trade mark owner. Thus it widens the scope of trade 
mark law. This has filtered through into the way in which the honest practices proviso has been 
interpreted. In Gillette,92 the Court held that the use is not in accordance with honest practices if it 
gives the impression of a commercial connection between the parties, takes unfair advantage of its 
distinctive character or discredits or denigrates the mark. It also cannot be honest if the junior user 
presents his product as an imitation or replica of the senior product. This is a very difficult definition, 
as, in using the types of activities that count as infringement as the definition of the proviso, it would 
seem to rule out the availability of the defences in almost every case.93 An alternative definition of 
honest practices, put forward in both Anheuser-Busch94 and Celine, takes a slightly more defendant-
friendly approach. In these cases the Court asks first whether the junior user is understood by the 
public as indicating a link between the junior goods and the trade mark owner, and then, whether the 
junior user ought to have been aware of this. The test articulated here at least takes the junior user’s 
state of mind into account, albeit in an objective manner. It still creates a conflict though between the 
availability of the defence and the definition of infringement to the extent that potentially only non-
infringing uses will fall within the scope of the Art.6 defences. This is heightened by the fact that the 
Court then calls on tribunals to consider whether the mark in question has a reputation from which the 
junior user may gain an advantage. Again this echoes one of the forms of infringement, but this time 
                                                          
91 First articulated in BMW, n.79, para.61, then repeated in Gerolsteiner, n.81, para.24, Anheuser-Busch, n. 71 
para.82, Gillette, n.87, para.41, Céline SARL v Céline SA (C-17/06)  [2007] E.C.R. I-7041, para.34.  
92 Gillette, n.87, paras 42-45.  
93 Gerolsteiner, n.81, para.25 states though that the fact that the junior use creates ‘aural confusion’ does not 
prevent the use from being honest. However, aural confusion appears to be some form of superficial confusion 
(perhaps similarity?) and the Court certainly does not go as far as to say that the use is in accordance with honest 
practices if there is overall confusion as to origin.  
94 Anheuser-Busch, n.71, para.83.  
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without any mention of the junior user’s state of mind.95 Consequently, recourse to the interests 
underlying the provisions of the Directive has resulted in both the substantive defences and the honest 
practices proviso being interpreted in a way that gives maximum protection to registered trade marks.  
 
Due cause 
One example where the public interest has not been used to restrict trade mark law in the inter partes 
context is in relation to ‘due cause’. Art.5(2) allows trade mark owners to prevent the use of identical 
or similar marks where the junior use causes detriment to the senior mark’s distinctive character or 
repute or takes unfair advantage of it. However, this is subject to a caveat that the junior use must be 
‘without due cause’ for an action to stand. For a long time it was thought that the ‘due cause’ proviso 
was limited to situations where the junior user was compelled to use an otherwise infringing mark.  
Such situations were limited to, if there was a legal requirement for the junior user to use the mark, or 
if he had an earlier right to do so. However, in Leidseplein, the CJEU used the public interest to 
narrow the scope of trade mark law and ruled that the proviso was not so limited. The Court noted that 
the purpose behind the provision was to strike a balance between the interests of the trade mark owner 
and those of other economic operators.96 Interpreting ‘due cause’ restrictively would not take those 
third party interests into account97 and so it needed to take into account how the junior use had been 
using his mark – for example, did the use predate the earlier use? Had the junior user built up a 
reputation that was capable of being expanded in to other product markets?  Moreover, it was 
necessary to consider the subjective intention to the junior user.98 This stands in marked contrast to 
the approach taken to ‘honest practices’ which is more restrictive and essentially an objective test. 
                                                          
95 Celine, n.91, para.34.  
96 Leidseplein Beheer BV and Hendrikus de Vries v Red Bull GmbH and Red Bull Nederland BV (C-65/12) 
EU:C:2014:49, paras 41-46.  
97 Para.48 
98 Paras 50-60.  
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Perhaps the explanation is that the balance in the case of Art.5(2) was already skewed by the fact that 
the Court has taken an expansive approach to scope of unfair advantage, taking in any unremunerated 
advantage99, and there was only due cause left to redress this balance.  
Repackaging 
Thus far we have considered infringement arising from use of potentially conflicting marks by 
competitors in relation to their own goods or services. Art.7 prevents a trade mark owner from 
prohibiting the use of its own trade mark in relation to goods that it has put on the market, or which 
have been put on the market with its consent. However, this is subject to a proviso, contained in 
Art.7(2) that the trade mark owner can nevertheless oppose the further commercialisation of his goods 
where there are ‘legitimate reasons’ to do so.  
 The CJEU has explained that the interest behind Art.7 is ‘to reconcile the fundamental interest 
in protecting trade mark rights with the fundamental interest in the free movement of goods within the 
common market.’ Once again, this is an example in the infringement context of the underlying interest 
being one of balance and again, the countervailing interest is free movement, rather than competitors’ 
rights. 
 The concept of parallel importation is well established, predating the Directive. Consequently, 
there is little exploration of the interests involved in the recent jurisprudence establishing the general 
principles of parallel importation. However, the Art.7 case law has been construed to go further, 
allowing not just the resale of the parallel imported goods, but also their repackaging by third parties 
into new packaging bearing the original trade mark. If one stops to think about it, this is a remarkable 
concession, as it grants to a completely unconnected third party the ability to apply the trade mark 
owner’s trade mark to goods. Nevertheless, this is exactly what was affirmed (drawing on pre-
Directive jurisprudence) in Bristol Myers Squibb (‘BMS’). First the Court cited the interest behind 
Art.7. It then noted that a trade mark should only be allowed to derogate from free movement of 
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goods when this was justified to protect the specific subject matter of the trade mark, which was to 
guarantee that all goods bearing that trade mark originated from the same undertaking. Where goods 
are repackaged in a careful fashion, this function is not affected. Thus, in establishing the principle of 
allowing repackaging, the Court has taken an approach that restricts the scope of trade mark law. 
However, in applying the rules on when repackaging is allowed, the Court has been more mindful of 
the trade mark owner’s element of the balance behind Art.7, and has interpreted it in a way that 
maximises the scope of trade mark law.  
 Thus, in BMS, the Court suggested that repackaging would not be allowed, unless a restrictive 
test was met – namely: 
i.  that preventing repackaging would contribute to the artificial partitioning of the EU 
market;  
ii. that the repackaging could not adversely affect the original condition of the product;  
iii. that the owner of the mark receives prior notice before the repackaged product is put on 
sale; and  
iv. that it must state on the new packaging the identity of the repackager.100  
 
Moreover, subsequent cases have applied this test in a restrictive manner. Of those that draw on the 
interest underlying the provision, perhaps the most fundamental is Boehringer Ingelheim,101 where the 
Court found that repackaging, by its very nature, creates a risk to the original condition of the product. 
                                                          
100 Para.49.  
101 Bristol-Myers Squibb v Paranova A/S and C. H. Boehringer Sohn, Boehringer Ingelheim KG and Boehringer 
Ingelheim A/S v Paranova A/S and Bayer Aktiengesellschaft and Bayer Danmark A/S v Paranova A/S  (C-
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Therefore, the presumption must be against repackaging102 unless it is necessary to do so in order to 
enable marketing of the parallel imported product into the destination Member State.  
 The sharp-eyed will have noted that in this context too, the Court has raised the question of 
whether the junior user of the mark in question is ‘necessary’. In this case the question was whether 
the repackaging is necessary to avoid the partitioning of the EU market. As with the other inter partes 
cases, necessity has been interpreted restrictively, in a way that limits the ability of third parties to use 
trade marks.  
Unlike the other uses of necessity that we have come across, this one originates in the 
jurisprudence rather than the Directive. In Pharmacia & Upjohn, the Court observed in relation to 
artificial partitioning that  
where the trade-mark rights in the importing Member State allow the proprietor of the trade 
mark to prevent it being reaffixed after repackaging of the product or being replaced, and 
where the repackaging with reaffixing or the replacement of the trade mark is necessary to 
enable the products to be marketed by the parallel importer in the importing Member State, 
there are obstacles to intracommunity trade giving rise to artificial partitioning of the markets 
between Member States within the meaning of the case-law cited, whether or not the 
proprietor intended such partitioning.103 
It went on to say that the replacement of the trade mark had to be ‘objectively necessary’. This would 
be the case if the importer could not gain ‘effective’ market access because, for example, of national 
rules preventing the use of the trade mark originally affixed to the packaging.104 This was broadened 
somewhat in Boehringer Ingelheim to take in situations where medical-related rules of practices 
                                                          
102 Rather than, as the referring Court had argued, that repackaging does not change the quality of the goods 
inside the packaging and that therefore repackaging should be presumed acceptable unless proven otherwise. 
103 Pharmacia & Upjohn SA v Paranova A/S (C-379/97) [1999] E.C.R. I-6927; [2000] 1 C.M.L.R. 51, para.39. 
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specific to the destination jurisdiction meant that it could not or would not be sold in its original 
size.105 However, repackaging merely to confer a commercial advantage would not suffice.106 As in 
the case of the defences, this is a strict approach to necessity, limited to situations where effectively 
the junior user has no choice, rather than leaving the junior user any discretion as to what would be 
the most effective way to access consumers. Thus it expands the reach of trade mark law.  
 A further example of the expansive approach to trade mark law in this context in the light of 
the underlying interest being identified is in relation to relabelling. Relabelling occurs when, instead 
of placing the trade marked goods in new packaging in order to access the market, the junior user 
places a sticker on the original packaging with additional information, such as a translation of 
ingredients or safety instructions. The products are not removed from their original packaging, so the 
risk to them must be far less than in the case of repackaging. Nevertheless, the Court in Loendersloot 
found that exactly the same test applies to relabelling as to repackaging.107 By requiring the rules to 
apply to relabelling, the CJEU potentially increased the risk that a mark would be found to be 
infringed, rather than legitimately further commercialised.  
 
Further commercialisation  
Emboldened by the stated need to balance the fundamental interest in the protection of trade mark 
rights with the fundamental interest in the free movement of goods,108 in Dior v Evora, the CJEU 
                                                          
105 Boehringer Ingelheim KG, Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma KG, Glaxo Group Ltd, The Wellcome Foundation 
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significantly expanded the reach of Art.7(2). This provision states that the trade mark owner may 
oppose the resale of trade marked goods where it has legitimate reasons to do so. Until Dior v Evora, 
it was thought that this applied primarily in situation where the physical condition of the goods had 
changed, and so the trade mark no longer gave a truthful message about who was responsible for the 
quality of the goods. However, in Dior, the Court found that the interest of the trade mark owner 
covered the value of his mark, which consists of both the physical condition of the goods bearing it, 
and image of the mark, which in this case was one of luxury and prestige.109 Consequently, the senior 
user could control, to some extent at least, not just the fact of the resale of those goods, but also how 
that resale was advertised.110 As was the case with Art.5(1)(a), there is a process going on here which 
is intimately connected to the way in which the interest behind the relevant provision is expressed. As 
a first step, the fact that the provision has an underlying rationale in protecting the trade mark owner’s 
interests is expressed. Next, content is given to those interests. Since the Court is looking at 
underlying interests, that content is expansive as the Court is not constrained by the wording of the 
provision, and the result is an expansion of the scope of trade mark law.111  
The outliers 
There are a couple of groups of cases which do not fit neatly into the pattern that we have identified of 
the public interest being used to narrow trade mark law in registrability cases and expand its scope in 
inter partes cases. It should be noted though that these atypical cases are, in a sense, hybrids. While 
they are registrability/revocation cases, they take place against a factual background where there are 
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111 Although in both cases, the full impact of the expansion is yet to be realised, with the exception in respect of 
Art.7(2) being Copad SA v Christian Dior couture SA, Vincent Gladel and Société industrielle lingerie (SIL) (C-
59/08) [2009] E.C.R. I-3421,  where Art.7(2) was used to maintain a selective distribution agreement by arguing 
that resale in outlets outside the agreement were damaging the luxury image of the mark.  
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two parties involved and where there are existing trade mark/goodwill rights and so are, in a sense, 
similar to the infringement cases.  
Acquiescence 
The public interest identified in relation to acquiescence is ‘generally to strike a balance between the 
interest of the proprietor of a trade mark to safeguard its essential function, on the one hand, and the 
interests of other economic operators in having signs capable of denoting their products and services’. 
Thus, junior availability plays an important role, but is counterbalanced by the need to protect trade 
mark rights.112 Thus, in Levi, the Court found that, where a mark has been revoked because the acts or 
invalidity of its proprietor have caused it to lose its distinctiveness, it cannot form the basis of an 
infringement action under Art.5.113  This favours availability. On the other hand, in Budweiser,114 the 
Court held that the five year period of acquiescence could only be exhausted when the senior user is 
in a position to actually oppose that use.115 In this case, this meant that there was no acquiescence 
where the senior user had known of the junior use for more than 30 years but had been unable to stop 
it as the courts in the UK had held that both parties were honest concurrent users of the sign. This 
outcome technically favours the trade mark owner over the junior user. It is submitted though that 
given the complicated factual situations at play here, which implicate issues of fairness and equity, the 
acquiescence cases should be considered separately from the general argument.  
Deceptive marks 
Under Art.3(1)(g), a mark cannot be registered (and will be liable to be revoked if it is registered) if it 
is ‘of such a nature as to deceive the public’. In Emanuel,116 the designer Elizabeth Emanuel assigned 
                                                          
112 Levi Strauss & Co. v Casucci SpA (C-145/05) [2006] E.C.R. I-3703, para.29.  
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a trade mark consisting of her name to a third party. She then applied for the ELIZABETH 
EMANUEL mark to be revoked for deceptiveness. The Court identified the public interest behind this 
provision as 
‘consumer protection, [which] must raise the question of the risk of confusion which such a 
trade mark may engender in the mind of the average consumer, especially where the person to 
whose name the mark corresponds originally personified the goods bearing that mark.’117 
 In this case, the Court questioned whether consumers would be deceived by the mark. Even if 
consumers were influenced in their decision to purchase by the ELIZABETH EMANUEL name, 
thinking that Ms Emanuel designed the clothing, they would not be deceived in a trade mark sense 
because the characteristics and qualities of the garment were guaranteed by the undertaking that 
owned the trade mark.118 In a sense, this widens the scope of trade mark law by limiting the 
circumstances in which revocation would take place. This though is based on consumer perception 
which, as we have seen previously, sometimes seems to override the raw public interest. It should also 
be noted that while deceptiveness is one of the absolute grounds, in this case at least, underlying the 
claim was essentially an inter partes action between the trade mark owner and Ms Emanuel.  
 
Conclusion  
This piece has sought to show that, while notions of the public interest play a crucial role in European 
trade mark law, there is no single public interest at play. Indeed, twelve (sometimes overlapping)   
interests have been identified from the case law, which are listed in the order in which they were 
discussed:  
1. To ensure certain signs can be freely used by all (registrability of descriptive signs); 
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2. To ensure that the sign in question can act in accordance with the essential function 
(registrability of signs lacking distinctiveness); 
3. To prevent trade mark protection from granting its proprietor a monopoly on technical 
solutions or functional characteristics of a product which a user is likely to seek in the 
products of competitors (functional signs as per Art.3(1)(e));  
4. To protect the trade mark owner’s specific interests as a proprietor, i.e. to ensure that the trade 
mark can fulfil its functions (‘double identity’ infringement); 
5. To protect the individual interests of proprietors of earlier marks which come into conflict 
with the sign applied for, and so to guarantee the mark as an indication of origin (confusion-
based infringement); 
6. To reconcile the fundamental interests of trade mark protection with free movement of goods 
and freedom to provide services so that trade marks can fulfil their essential role in a system 
of undistorted competition (the Art.6 defences); 
7. To  ensure that all economic operators have the opportunity to use descriptive indications (the 
descriptive use defence); 
8. To embody a duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the trade mark owner 
(the ‘honest practices’ proviso to the Art.6 defences); 
9. To strike a balance between the interests of the trade mark owner and those of other operators 
(the ‘due cause’ exception to dilution and unfair advantage); 
10. To recognised the fundamental interests in protecting trade mark rights (both in terms of the 
physical condition of the goods and the image of the mark) with the fundamental interest in 
protecting the free movement of goods within the common market (exhaustion of rights); 
11. To strike a balance between the interests of the proprietor of the trade mark to guard the 
mark’s ability to act in accordance with its essential function and the interests of other 
economic operators in having signs capable of denoting their products and services 
(acquiescence); and 
12. To protect consumers in instances where there is a risk of confusion (deceptive marks).  
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Within this diverse set of interests, there is a dichotomy between definitions of the term ‘public 
interest’. In registrability cases, the public interest is used to protect wider third party interests that 
might be prejudiced by acceptance of the mark for registration. However, where there are pre-existing 
rights, as in infringement and defences cases, these trade mark owners’ interests are given at least 
equal weighting through the mechanism of the public interest.  
Some might see having such a malleable definition of the public interest as problematic. 
However, it is this author’s contention that this flexible notion of the public interest can act as an 
important safety valve within the trade mark system. It allows tribunals to protect the interests of all 
parties involved in a very nuanced fashion, even where their interests have not been specifically 
spelled out by the drafters of European trade mark legislation. Whether this is a deliberate strategy of 
the CJEU is difficult to second-guess. The dichotomy between the two approaches is quite clear, with 
few deviating cases. However given the lack of explicit acknowledgement of what is happening this 
such an approach is likely to be subconscious at most.  It is probable though that, like much of EU 
trade mark law, it is growing organically in a way that has, for now at least, reached a point of stasis.  
 
